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“I think there is a world market for
maybe five computers.”
—Thomas Watson,
chairman of IBM, 1943
“I have traveled the length and breadth
of this country and talked with the best
people, and I can assure you that data
processing is a fad that won’t last out
the year.”
—The editor in charge of
business books for
Prentice Hall, 1957
“There is no reason anyone would want
a computer in their home.”
—Ken Olson, president,
chairman and founder of
Digital Equipment Corp., 1977
echnological innovations are
rapidly changing the way people
live. Computers, fax machines,
mobile phones and online computer
services allow people to work faster
and more efficiently, with ever-
expanding access to information.
With each new generation of ma-
chine, high-tech products become
more pervasive household fixtures.
No longer is it only the wealthy
who can afford to own a VCR or
cellular phone. New products are
being developed every day to meet
consumers’ voracious appetites
for faster, more efficient ways to
conduct business and enhance
leisure time.
Thanks to the acceptance and
affordability of new technologies,
certain high-tech industries have
grown into a rapidly expanding
segment of the economy. In Texas,
employment at high-tech firms has
grown twice as fast as the state’s
overall economy during the past
10 years.
1
Although Texas’ economic roots
are grounded in agriculture and oil,
the state has pioneered many tech-
nological innovations. Dallas’ Texas
Instruments (TI) was among the
first companies to mass produce
transistors, and a TI engineer, Jack
Kilby, developed the integrated
circuit. Another Dallas company—
Electronic Data Systems Corp.
(EDS)—was among the first firms
to offer data processing services.
And Dell Computer Corp., head-
quartered in Austin, is the fifth
largest maker of personal computers
in the world and is one of the
fastest growing U.S. corporations.
Despite recent lean years for the
defense industry, Texas defense
giants—including LTV, Bell Heli-
copter and Lockheed (formerly
General Dynamics)—have been
important catalysts for high-tech
advancement. As such firms moved
to Texas during the World War II
buildup, they brought scientists and
engineers. Other workers became
skilled in electronics, telecommuni-
cations, and weapons and aerospace
manufacturing. Now, even as em-
ployment in the defense industry
wanes, the private sector is making
use of defense-related technological
advances.
How Much High-Tech in Texas?
The Texas economy, once driven
by resource-based industries such as















A Look at the Top U.S.
Trading Partnersstill very important to the state’s
economy, its share of total employ-
ment fell from its early 1980s peak
of 5 percent to about 2 percent in
1994.
2 In contrast, the share of
Texas employment in high-tech
industries rose from about 2 per-
cent in the mid-1970s to 3.4 percent
in 1994.
3
As Chart 1 shows, high-tech
employment grew more than twice
as fast in Texas than in the nation
as a whole during 1988–94.
4 Texas’
strongest performance relative to
the nation’s has come in computer-
and telecommunications-related
industries.
5 This category includes
firms that make computers, com-
puter chips and cellular phones and
firms that provide programming or
data processing services. Since 1988,
employment in Texas computer-
and telecommunications-related
industries has grown more than eight
times the national rate. Currently,
the share of computer-related and
telecommunications-related em-
ployment to total employment is
2.5 percent in Texas and 2.1 per-
cent in the United States.
Chart 2 shows the 10 largest high-
tech industries in Texas. Texas’
employment in four of these 10 in-
dustries exceeds the national aver-
age. These industries (highlighted
in bright red) are computer-related
services, electronic components
manufacturing, computer manufac-
turing and communications equip-
ment manufacturing—all of which
are computer- and telecommuni-
cations-related industries.
Computer-related services. As com-
puter and communications technol-
ogy has become more widely used,
the number of service firms has sky-
rocketed. Thus, it is not surprising
that the largest high-tech industry
in Texas is service-related. Employ-
ment in Texas’ computer-related
services industry has grown almost
50 percent since 1988, slightly faster
than the national average. Included
in this category are firms that pro-
vide computer programming, data
processing, software design, systems
design and information retrieval.
Plano’s EDS, for example, is the
nation’s largest provider of com-
puter services to business and
government.
The computer-related services in-
dustry accounts for almost 1 percent
of total Texas employment, which
is roughly the same size as Texas’
fabricated metals manufacturing
industry. However, employment
statistics may drastically underesti-
mate the actual number of computer-
related jobs in the Texas economy.
Employment statistics count only
firms that produce a service, such
as programming. Programmers who
work for a bank, for instance, are
not counted. Because many firms
employ their own programmers or
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Chart 2
High-Tech Employment in Texas
(Shares of 1994 Total Nonagricultural Employment
For Largest 10 High-Tech Industries in the State)
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2ment in this sector is probably much
higher than the numbers suggest.
The greatest job growth in Texas’
computer-related services industry
has been from firms that provide
software design and computer pro-
gramming (Chart 3). Since 1988,
jobs in software production have
grown by 105 percent in Texas,
compared with 76 percent at the
national level. Austin alone has
more than 500 software companies.
Computer programming employ-
ment in Texas has risen 96 percent
since 1988, compared with 76 per-
cent nationally.
Electronic components manufacturing.
As Chart 2 indicates, the second
largest high-tech industry in Texas
is electronic components manufac-
turing. This industry includes firms
that produce computer chips and
circuit boards, both hot commodi-
ties worldwide. Since 1988, circuit
board manufacturing employment
in Texas has expanded four times
faster than in the nation.
Several large companies pro-
duce computer chips in Texas, in-
cluding TI, Motorola, Advanced
Micro Devices (AMD), Hitachi,
Cyrix and National Semiconductor.
Nationally, the computer chip indus-
try has undergone a retrenchment
in the last several years. However,
announced expansions by Hitachi,
Motorola and TI and a worldwide
shortage of computer chips suggest
that this segment of Texas’ high-
tech industry has recovered and
should see strong growth in the
future.
Computer manufacturing. Texas is
quickly becoming synonymous with
computer production. The Lone
Star State is home to Dell, Compaq,
TI and AST. Employment at com-
puter makers, while falling nation-
ally, has risen strongly in Texas.
6
Since 1988, Texas employment at
computer makers has risen 34
percent, and employment in the
computer peripherals industry,
which includes printers, has risen
by 15 percent. Dell exemplifies this
growth; Dell recently announced
that it would build a third facility
in Austin because its second facility




manufacturing includes firms that
produce telephone, radio and tele-
vision equipment. Texas job growth
in this industry has not been as
strong as in other high-tech sectors,
mainly because new technology has
made workers more productive.
Nevertheless, employment growth
Chart 3
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in this industry has been positive
in Texas while declining at the
national level. The Dallas/Fort Worth
area is the heart of Texas’ telecom-
munications industry, with firms
such as Nortel, DSC, MCI and Nokia.
Recently, Dallas/Fort Worth was
chosen as the site for the headquar-
ters of PCS PrimeCo, a joint venture
of Bell Atlantic, Nynex, US West
and AirTouch Communications.
Where Are the Jobs?
Like Dallas, with its communica-
tions nexus, other Texas cities have
attracted concentrations of high-
tech industries. Computer-related
services and the production of
electronic components, computers
and communications equipment—
major players in the Texas high-
tech sector—are located mostly in
major cities, as shown in Chart 4.
7
Austin’s computer manufacturing
sector provides more than half of
the state’s jobs in that industry. The
capital city also has a large concen-
tration of computer chip makers,
such as Motorola and AMD, and
their suppliers, such as Applied
Materials and Tokyo Electron
America. As a result, one-fifth of
the state’s electronic component
manufacturing is in Austin.
With 52 percent of the state’s
total, Dallas/Fort Worth has the lion’s
3
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NOTE: Percentages are each city’s share of Texas jobs in
four leading high-tech industries–computer-related
services, electronic components manufacturing,
computer manufacturing and communications
manufacturing. The share of total employment
these four industries contribute to the Texas
economy exceeds the national average.
SOURCES: Texas Employment Commission and Texas
State Comptroller of Public Accounts.share of high-tech jobs. Over half
of the state’s computer-related
services providers, such as pro-
gramming and software design
firms, are in D/FW. The area also
houses most of the state’s commu-
nications equipment manufacturing
firms, with almost 80 percent of
Texas jobs in that sector. D/FW
telecommunication firms, such as
DSC, Siemens, Motorola and Erics-
son, produce products ranging from
switching devices used to transmit
data and voices to cellular phones.
Like Austin, Dallas/Fort Worth has
a large concentration of computer
chip manufacturers and is home to
more than 50 percent of the state’s
electronic equipment jobs.
Houston’s strongest high-tech
industries are computer manufac-
turing and computer-related services.
Home of Compaq Computer, Hous-




Texas’ history in the defense and
oil industries helps explain why
the state has become a high-tech
mecca. Texas Instruments, for ex-
ample, built on its success in the oil
business to become a large defense
contractor and later one of the
largest computer chip producers in
the country.
8 But other factors have
contributed to the state’s appeal to
high-tech firms as well.
Texas’ low costs, high-tech re-
search, large labor pool and promi-
nence as a worldwide distribution
hub have drawn firms to the state.
Many of Texas’ high-tech exports
go to Mexico. In 1994, for the first
time since state export figures
became available in 1987, Texas’
leading export industry was elec-
tronic components manufacturing,
which contributed $11.2 billion in
state exports. The industrial machin-
ery and computer manufacturing
industry was a close second with
$11.1 billion in exports. Of the
electronic components exports,
$5.8 billion went to Mexico, along
with $2.4 billion of the industrial
machinery and computer equip-
ment. Several electronics firms,
such as General Electric, Toshiba
and Philips Consumer Electronics,
are located in the El Paso/Juarez
area and take advantage of the
maquiladora program between
the United States and Mexico.
In addition, Texas is an ideal
location for firms exporting else-
where. Several high-tech firms
(such as Nokia, Zenith Electronics
and GWS Perlos—a phone parts
supplier) have located manufac-
turing plants or distribution centers
at Alliance Airport in Fort Worth,
partly because the airport’s central
location and air, rail and highway
access make it ideal for global
distribution.
High-tech firms tend to cluster
near one another to be close to
suppliers and skilled workers. More
than 20 suppliers followed Applied
Materials to Austin after its move in
1988, for example. Texas’ labor
force is younger and faster growing
than the national average. And,
while Texas’ level of educational
attainment is about even with the
national average, the skill distribu-
tion is widespread.
9 Despite its large
percentage of high school drop-
outs, Texas also has a high percent-
age of skilled workers who help
attract high-tech firms to the state.
High-tech companies have cited
low costs as another factor drawing
them to Texas. Although the real
estate market has been improving in
recent years, Texas apartment rents
and construction costs are much
lower than the national average.
The average price of a Dallas home,
for example, remains about 10 per-
cent below the national average.
Texas is also a low-tax state. Among
the 50 states, Texas ranks 31st in
per capita state and local tax reve-
nues and 42nd in per capita ex-
penditures.
Finally, Texas has industry con-
sortiums and universities that pro-
vide high-tech research to benefit
high-tech industries. For example,
Austin is home to two of the nation’s
4
“In Texas, employment
at high-tech firms has
grown twice as fast as
the state’s overall
economy during the
past 10 years.”premiere research consortiums:
Microelectronics and Computer
Technology Corp. (MCC) and
Sematech. These consortiums enable
companies with common require-
ments for new technology to share
the costs and risks of development.
Also, the Technology Licensing
Office at Texas A&M University and
the IC2 Institute at the University of
Texas at Austin provide university
research that benefits high-tech
industries.
Clouds on a Bright Future?
Although Texas’ high-tech future
looks bright, a few clouds on the
horizon could impede employment
growth. Environmental consider-
ations, such as water purity, could
deter companies from relocating to
or expanding operations in Texas.
Water is an important input in the
computer chip manufacturing pro-
cess, and companies in Austin are
concerned about the water availa-
bility from the Edwards Aquifer.
A lack of office space in some
prime high-tech office districts is
another consideration. The office
vacancy rate in Northwest Austin—
the most popular area among high-
tech companies—is about 3 percent.
Even after completion of construc-
tion projects under way, space may
not be available to meet demand.
Although they are lower than the
national average, Dallas’ suburban
office rents have risen rapidly in the
past two years and are eating away
at one of Texas’ biggest draws.
10
Signs also indicate that Texas’
skilled labor market is tightening.
Industry contacts in Austin report
that they must look beyond Texas’
borders to find skilled workers. In
fact, the estimated unemployment
rate for engineers and software
developers is below 1 percent in
Austin. Several high-tech compa-
nies that recently located outside of
Texas cited the state’s tightening
labor pool as a major factor in their
decision. So far, Austin appears to
be the only Texas city straining at
the seams, but labor market pressure
could occur in other Texas cities
with a high concentration of high-
tech industries.
Despite these obstacles, Texas
should be a major benefactor in
the quest for faster, more efficient
ways to work and better leisure
products. High employment growth
should continue in high-tech in-
dustries concentrated in Texas—
namely, computer-related services,
electronic components manufactur-
ing, computer manufacturing and
communications equipment manu-
facturing—for several reasons.
Industry consortiums, such as MCC
and Sematech, and ongoing research
at Texas universities yield synergies
for high-tech businesses. The state’s
already strong base of high-tech
companies and suppliers can entice
other companies to relocate to
Texas. And Texas’ growing labor
force and the ease of relocating
workers from other areas of the
country are valuable assets that





1 In this article, we define high-tech to
include the following three-digit Stan-
dard Industrial Code (SIC) categories:
pharmaceuticals and drugs, computer
manufacturing, electrical transmission
and distribution equipment manufactur-
ing, electrical industrial apparatus manu-
facturing, household audio and video
equipment manufacturing, communica-
tions equipment manufacturing, elec-
tronic components manufacturing,
miscellaneous electrical machinery manu-
facturing, measuring and controlling
instruments manufacturing, photographic
equipment and supplies manufacturing,
computer-related services, and research
and development. Our definition of
high-tech industries is taken from the
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts.
The comptroller’s office bases its defi-
nition of high-tech on the following
characteristics: (1) employing a higher
percentage of technicians, engineers
and scientists than most manufacturers
and (2) having an above-average
research and development component.
Because of recent budget cuts and
military personnel cuts, ammunitions
5
and aerospace industries are excluded
from this analysis.
2 The oil and gas extraction industry
accounts for a larger share of state out-
put than of total state employment. In
1982, oil and gas extraction accounted
for roughly 18 percent of total state
output, compared with about 7 percent
in 1994.
3 We use the Bureau of Labor Statistics
ES202 employment data for the U.S. and
Texas three- and four-digit SIC sectors.
In the calculations of employment
shares, we use U.S. and Texas total
nonagricultural employment from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics Establishment
Survey. For the city employment data, we
use ES202 employment data provided
by the Texas Employment Commission
(TEC) and the Texas Comptroller of
Public Accounts.
4 We use 1988 as our reference point
because several four-digit SIC sectors in
high-tech industries were not available
before 1988.
5 Computer- and telecommunications-
related employment is a subset of high-
tech employment and includes computer
manufacturing, electrical transmissions
and distribution equipment manufactur-




neous electrical machinery manufactur-
ing and computer-related services.
6 Nationally, employment in computer
manufacturing has fallen since 1988, but
production has risen 136 percent. Over
the past two decades, computer manu-
facturing has become much less labor-
intensive because of new equipment
technology. While output has risen
sharply, new technology has enabled
workers to become more productive.
7 Due to confidentiality concerns, TEC
will not release computer manufacturing
employment for Houston and Fort
Worth. We approximate this employ-
ment by using estimates for the number
of jobs at computer manufacturers
Compaq (Houston), Tandy Electronics
(Fort Worth) and AST (Fort Worth).
8 See “Industry: High Tech and Defense,”
Forces of Change (Austin: Texas Comp-
troller of Public Accounts), 1994.
9 See Stephen P. A. Brown and Lea An-
derson, “The Future of the Southwest
Economy,” Southwest Economy, Novem-
ber 1988.
10 While downtown Dallas has one of the
nation’s highest office vacancy rates,
the suburban rate has tightened. Most




rates yields two important relation-
ships:
and
where nominal GDP growth equals
growth in the dollar volume of
gross domestic production (output
growth plus inflation). U.S. output
typically grows at about 2.5 percent
annually. Thus, the equation of
exchange strongly suggests that,
over the long run, inflation can be
kept at zero by limiting money
supply growth to equal 2.5 percent
minus growth in velocity.
Money holdings typically fall
and velocity rises as the spread
between a riskless short-term market
interest rate and the average yield
on monetary assets rises. The
stability of the relationship between
interest rates and velocity is what
makes it possible for money to be
a useful indicator of not only in-
flation, but also of nominal GDP
(P ´ Y ), since GDP data are avail-
able after a long lag, unlike data on
money and interest rates. If velocity
is predictable, then by controlling
money supply growth, the Federal
Reserve can control long-run in-
flation. While this sounds easy,
shifts in how people conduct their
finances and how they pay for
goods can undermine the stability of
the money–GDP relationship, thus
making the Fed’s inflation-fighting
job more difficult in practice.
History bears this out. The M1
monetary aggregate that measures
the money supply as checking
deposits plus currency was once
touted as the “holy grail” by mone-
tarists. But M1 began to fall from
grace in the mid-1970s when its
velocity was unusually high, and M1
growth underpredicted real GDP,
based on prior velocity behavior.
Then in the early 1980s, the interest-
rate sensitivity of M1 jumped as
financial innovations and deregula-
tion created new deposits that
combined savings and transactions
features and helped firms avoid
holding non-interest-bearing de-
mand deposits. As a result, atten-
tion turned to M2, a broader and
less interest-rate-sensitive aggregate
that was created in 1980.
M2 was redefined to include not
only conventional M1, passbook
savings accounts and small time
deposits, but also new types of
money, such as money market
mutual funds, overnight instruments
and, in 1982, money market deposit
accounts. M2 had a stable relation-
ship with nominal GDP during the
1980s (Small and Porter 1989).
However, this relationship broke
down in the 1990s as M2 became
more sensitive to bond yields and
as households shifted toward bond
and stock mutual funds and toward
Treasury securities (see Duca 1995b
for references).
Such breakdowns in the link be-
tween money and nominal output
have spurred efforts to either rede-
fine money to include new types of
“money” or revise money models
to account for changing relation-
ships between money and nominal
output.
1 Understanding why the
money–income relationship can
shift is critical to finding new ways
of deriving information from money.
Why the Money–Nominal GDP
Relationship Can Shift
A stable link between M2 and
nominal GDP will hold as long as
people handle their finances in the
same way.
2 However, a market
economy will continuously create
new financial products and markets
will react to fundamental changes in
the tastes of households (Table 1).
Since the early 1980s, the attrac-
tiveness to households of owning
non-M2 assets has increased be-
cause of two types of technological
change: lower costs of transferring
funds from nonmonetary assets to
transactions deposits (from bond
mutual funds to money market
funds, for instance) and greater use
“What growth in
conventionally measured
money means for inflation
will continue to change.”
B
ecause inflation can quickly
disrupt an economy, central
banks have tried to develop poli-
cies to keep inflation in check. One
approach assumes that there is a
stable relationship between eco-
nomic activity and the measured
money supply. Recently, this rela-
tionship has been changing because
people have been changing how
they handle their finances and how
they pay for goods and services. As
a result, what the measured money
supply means, in terms of what it
reveals about economic activity,
has also changed.
Does M2 Still Measure Up?
Money and economic activity are
linked by the famous equation of
exchange:
money ´ money’s velocity
= the price level ´ real GDP,
or
M ´ V = P ´ Y.
In other words, changing hands V
times during a year, the money stock,
M, facilitates the transaction of Y
goods, which each cost P dollars.






















6of financial services from nonasset
products (such as credit cards).
Nonmonetary assets are any assets
not included in the definition of the
monetary aggregates, while nonasset
products are instruments or ways
of conducting transactions that do
not directly and immediately involve
holding an asset (for example, using
a credit card to pay for something)
until final settlement is made. As
the cost of shifting between non-M2
assets and checkable deposits falls,
the incentive to hold checking
deposits to avoid transfer costs
declines. Since households balance
the transfer cost savings from hold-
ing money against the higher yields
on alternative assets, lower transfer
costs have induced lower money
holdings. For example, over the past
10 years, the costs of shifting from
a bond mutual fund to a checkable
money market fund have fallen as
transfer fees have fallen and as
transfers have become easier. As a
result, when longer term interest
rates (on bond funds) are high rela-
tive to short-term rates (on money
market funds), people are more
likely to hold bond funds today
than 10 years ago when transfers
involved higher fees and greater
headaches.
Thanks to improvements in
financial products, households and
firms can now better coordinate
cash inflow with cash outflow. As a
result, they can reduce check usage
by consolidating many purchases
into fewer check payments. They
also have less need to hold checking
balances for unexpected expenses.
Aside from technological changes,
a rise in households’ awareness of
assets outside of M2 and their
tolerance for risk can lead to unusual
weakness in M2. For example, if
households needed less extra return
on stocks to compensate them for
the extra investment risk, then at a
given gap between the yields on
M2 and stocks, they will hold less
M2 and more stocks.
Technology and New Products
Lower asset transfer costs. The
costs of shifting between non-M2
and checkable M2 assets have
fallen in several ways. First, load
(commission) fees on mutual funds
have fallen sharply over the past
two decades.
3 Furthermore, many
mutual funds now also allow a
greater number of free transfers
among funds in asset management
accounts. These accounts offer a
host of investments, including bonds
and equities, and allow no-cost
shifts among investments within
mutual fund families that typically
include a checkable money market
fund. So, a person who unexpect-
edly gets hit with a big car repair
bill can use the phone to shift funds
from an equity fund to a money
market fund (without incurring a
fee) and then write a money market
fund check. Furthermore, many
banks now offer mutual funds and
allow customers to jointly manage
their mutual fund and deposit
balances. Additionally, the Federal
Reserve has made it easier for
people to buy Treasury securities,
a change that, coupled with interest
rates, encouraged people to take
money out of M2 deposits and buy
Treasury securities.
4
More generally, the spread of
better information technology is
lowering transfer costs. In particu-
lar, the rise of electronic banking
(especially via personal computer)
poses potentially large reductions
in the pecuniary and convenience
costs of making such transfers.
5
Unfortunately, continuous data on
asset transfer costs over long periods
are lacking. Nevertheless, the limited
evidence implies that lower transfer
costs have led people to reduce M2
balances. In particular, lower transfer
costs of using bond and equity
funds likely explains why most of
the unusual weakness in M2 during
the 1990s has been in small time
deposits (which compete with stocks
and bonds) and money market
mutual funds (which were unusu-
ally weak when relative yields on
stocks and bonds yields were high).
Financial services from nonassets.
In the 1970s and 1980s, techno-
logical advances and high interest
rates induced firms to avoid using
non-interest-bearing demand de-
posits to conduct transactions. Cash
management techniques, coupled
with the increased use of electronic
transfers, allowed firms to more
easily and cheaply tap nonmonetary
assets to meet cash shortfalls. Break-
ing with the tradition of holding a
lot of non-interest-bearing demand
deposits, firms adopted cash man-
agement techniques that enabled
them to better predict their cash
Table 1
How Market Forces Can Cause Unusual Weakness in Money
Fundamental type of factor Examples
Technological innovations
Lower transfer costs Lower mutual fund commission (load) fees
Easier purchase of Treasury securities
Electronic banking
Easier banking and investing by phone
Financial services from nonassets More widespread credit cards and lines
Automatic teller machines
Electronic wires and transfers
Demographics, preferences and learning
Demographic shifts Rising population share of middle-aged
people preparing for retirement
Preferences and financial sophistication Rising share of households with portable
pensions due to IRA/Keogh laws and
increased job uncertainty
Greater tolerance of investment risk
7needs. Also, firms increasingly used
wire transfers when they needed to
shift funds. The result was a decline
in demand deposits held by firms.
Financial innovations later spread
to households after improvements
in computer software made such
innovations cost-effective for people.
By providing liquidity and by
enabling households to weather
temporary changes in asset prices
(such as stock prices), credit cards
and credit lines likely induced many
households to hold less money and
more nonmoney assets.
For example, using 1983 data,
Duca and Whitesell (1995) find that
each 10-percentage-point rise in the
probability of owning a credit card
lowers checking accounts by 9 per-
cent and checkable money market
mutual funds and money market
deposit accounts by 11 percent. The
impact of credit cards on checkable
balances is likely larger today be-
cause credit card ownership has
spread, credit cards are more widely
accepted, credit card purchases are
more quickly processed, and con-
sumers are now offered greater in-
centives to use credit cards. Another
important innovation is the spread
of automatic teller machines (ATMs).
ATMs have reduced the need for
people to carry extra cash by allow-
ing them to easily withdraw cash
from their checking or savings
accounts.
6
Evidence shows that because
people gained a greater choice in
how to pay for goods, the composi-
tion of M2 had shifted away from
transactions and toward nontrans-
actions accounts. Coupled with
lower transfer costs, greater use of
nonmoney ways of making payments
could now be lowering M2, in
addition to altering its composition.
Are Demographics, Preferences
And Learning Playing a Role?
Greater tolerance of investment
risk can stem from changes in
employment patterns, demograph-
ics and in other factors that boost
financial awareness.
Demographics. According to the
life-cycle theory of consumption,
people borrow when they are young
because their income is below that
of later years, save in middle age
when their income is highest and
then draw down their savings in
retirement. An implication of this
theory is that savings rates and the
share of wealth invested in higher
earning non-M2 assets should rise
in the peak earning years before
retirement. By increasing the aver-
age need to fund retirement, demo-
graphic trends may be inducing an
overall shift toward risky assets
with higher expected long-term
yields and away from lower earning
M2 deposits. Alternatively, as people
reach their peak earning years,
their ratio of income to spending
falls. As this ratio falls, so too will the
public’s demand for low-transactions
cost M2 deposits.
Consistent with these implica-
tions, Duca and Whitesell (1995)
find that small time and savings
deposits are higher for older age
groups, after controlling for income
and wealth. Furthermore, Morgan
(1994) finds that the average share
of household assets held in stocks
and bonds rises with the population
share of 35- to 54-year-old people.
Changing preferences and learning.
Two factors that could be depress-
ing M2 holdings are households’
increased awareness of investments
outside of M2 and an associated
rise in households’ willingness to
tolerate risk in the assets they con-
trol. Aside from new technology
and financial products, increased
job uncertainty and the liberaliza-
tion of IRA/401K accounts have
induced a shift toward portable
(defined contribution) retirement
plans that have given households
a greater role in managing their
retirement assets. This shift, in turn,
has induced households to incur
large, one-time costs to learn more
about bond and equity investments
for retirement. In addition, with
many mutual funds, people can
count their IRA/Keogh mutual fund
balances along with other mutual
fund holdings toward meeting the
minimum balance requirements for
opening asset management accounts.
As a result, IRA and Keogh assets
effectively reduce the minimum
balance requirement on non-IRA/
Keogh mutual fund assets. Consis-
tent with this, both IRA/Keogh and
non-IRA/Keogh bond and equity
fund assets rose in the mid-1980s
after tax laws were eased and in
the early 1990s.
7 Cross-section data
confirm a big shift in household
portfolios toward bond and equity
funds and away from bank CDs
since the late 1980s.
8
Conclusion
The recent breakdown in the
link between nominal GDP and
conventionally defined M2 reflects
how technological changes have
enabled households to hold less
money and more nonmonetary
assets. Such innovations have re-
duced the costs of transferring
funds from other assets to checking
accounts, or, as in the case of credit
cards and lines, have reduced the
need to hold money that arises from
mismatches of cash inflow and
outflow. Changes in tastes and the
age composition of the U.S. popu-
lation may also be heightening the
extent to which people can substi-
tute other financial assets for money.
The information revolution will
likely further reduce the benefits
from holding traditional forms of
money by fostering the spread of
new electronic types of money,
banking through personal computer,
credit lines and financial manage-
ment software. Together with these
advances, a likely continuing shift
toward portable (defined contribu-
tion) retirement plans and tax incen-
tives will likely increase peoples’
role in managing their retirement
assets. These factors will likely lead
people to further reduce their
holdings of conventionally defined
“money” and increase their invest-
ments in higher earning alternative
assets. As a result, what growth in
conventionally measured money
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I thank the late Stephen Goldfeld and my
many colleagues throughout the Federal
Reserve System for sharing their insights
on money with me over the years.
1 For examples, see Collins and Edwards
(1994), Duca (1995a and 1994) and
Koenig (1995).
2 For a more technical discussion, see
Duca’s (1995b) modified version of
Milbourne’s (1986) model of money.
3 For evidence, see Orphanides, Reid and
Small (1994).
4 See Feinman and Porter (1992).
5 For more details, see Holland and Cor-
tese (1995) and Lewis (1995).
6 Daniels and Murphy (1994a) find that a
100-percentage-point rise in the proba-
bility of ATM use increased the velocity
of currency (transactions/currency) by
40 to 45 percent for transactions account
holders, while Daniels and Murphy
(1994b) estimate that a 5-percent rise in
the proportion of ATM users would boost
average transactions account balances
by 4.5 percent. Together, these studies
imply that ATMs induced households
to shift from holding cash to holding
transactions balances in the mid-1980s.
7 See Duca (1995a) for evidence.
8 See Kennickell and Starr-McCluer (1994)
for cross-section evidence. These factors
are consistent with a study by Blanchard
(1993), who found that the extra return
that investors demand from equities
over bonds has trended downward
since the 1940s and abruptly fell in the
early 1980s.
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9Beyond the Border
A Look at the Top
U.S. Trading Partners
T
he U.S. economy grew 1.1 per-
cent in the second quarter of
this year, down from 2.7 percent in
the first quarter. How much of a
role has international trade played
in determining that growth, and
what is it likely to contribute in the
future? Over the past 14 years, U.S.
trade (exports plus imports) as a
share of gross domestic product
(GDP) increased from 8.8 percent
to 17.8 percent. As the role of trade
becomes more significant in the
U.S. economy, our trading partners’
economies have a greater effect
on the U.S. economy. This column
examines what is happening now
in the economies of the largest U.S.
trading partners and what 1996
may hold.
Canada represents nearly 22
percent of U.S. trade and is the top
U.S. trading partner. Because the
United States accounts for more than
80 percent of Canadian merchan-
dise exports, Canada’s economic
fortunes are closely tied to those of
the United States. In second-quarter
1995, Canada’s real GDP fell 1 per-
cent after a large drop in exports to
the United States. Capacity utiliza-
tion declined in the second quarter
as business inventories rose from
already-high levels. Consumers
also spent less on big-ticket items.
Probably the biggest source of
uncertainty has been Quebec’s quest
for secession. Before the vote, the
secession referendum caused some
uneasiness in financial markets, as
everyone tried to anticipate the
outcome. Despite current weak
economic conditions, forecasters
expect real GDP to grow 3.1 percent
in 1995 and 2.5 percent in 1996.
Japan’s economy appears to be
in a state of uncertainty. Although
real GDP grew 3.1 percent in the
second quarter after declining 0.1
percent in the first quarter, other
economic signals paint a different
picture. Industrial production and
capacity utilization have been falling
and unemployment rising. Difficul-
ties in the Japanese banking in-
dustry are adding to the economy’s
woes, and the government recently
introduced its sixth stimulus package
since 1992 in hopes of jump-starting
the economy. Blue Chip forecasters
predict growth of 1 percent for
1995 and 2.3 percent for 1996.
Mexico, the United States’ third
largest trading partner, is still re-
covering from the December 1994
peso devaluation. The country’s
real GDP fell 7.8 percent in the first
quarter of 1995, but only 3.1 per-
cent in the second quarter, on a
seasonally adjusted, quarterly change
basis. A bright spot is the drop in
interest rates on cetes, peso-denomi-
nated debt issued by the Mexican
government. The interest rate on
28-day cetes was 40.6 percent on
October 19, down dramatically
from the 80-percent high in April.
Mexico’s economic indicators
show some negatives, however.
Industrial production continues to
fall and is nearing the lowest rate
of the 1990s, while unemployment
is rising to the highest rate of the
decade. Although Mexico recently
repaid $700 million of its debt to the
United States, financial markets con-
tinue to rain on Mexico’s parade.
From September 4 to October 18,
Mexico’s Bolsa stock exchange de-
teriorated 10 percent and the peso
fell 7 percent. For the year, the
Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD)
expects Mexican real GDP to de-
cline by 3 to 4 percent. Growth
should resume in 1996, however,
at a rate of 2.5 percent.
Germany experienced 2.2-percent
growth in the second quarter, down
from 2.9-percent growth in the first
quarter and 3-percent growth for
1994. The unemployment rate re-
mains high, while industrial pro-
duction dropped significantly in
August after steadily increasing in
the past four months. Competitive
pressures, however, are helping
liberalize some parts of the economy.
For example, laws preventing retail
stores from selling past 6 p.m. are
being challenged, and there is a
movement to ease the tax burden
on businesses. The OECD expects
real GDP to grow by 2.9 percent in
1995 and 2.7 percent in 1996.
The United Kingdom experi-
enced real GDP growth of 1.8 per-
cent in the second quarter, down
from 2.6 percent in the first quarter.
Analysts attribute the slowdown to
a sharp drop in exports. On a more
positive note, the unemployment
rate has been steadily decreasing
over the past two years. Capacity
utilization remains far above aver-
age, and industry surveys have
reported more than half of all firms
are working at full capacity. Real
GDP is expected to grow 3 percent
in 1995 and 2.6 percent in 1996.
So, what does this all mean for
U.S. exports and growth? This year,
U.S. exports to Japan, Germany and
Canada have surpassed 1994 levels,
while exports to Mexico and the
United Kingdom have lost ground.
The outlook for next year is some-
what mixed as well. Mexico is ex-
pected to start its recovery next
year, although uncertainty is still
undermining the economy.
Canada, Germany and the United
Kingdom should grow at a healthy
rate in 1996. Forecasters expect
Japan’s global trade surplus to con-
tinue to decline throughout 1995
and 1996. Given Japan’s weakness,





FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE DATA
For more information on employment data,
see “Reassessing Texas Employment Growth”
(Southwest Economy, July/August 1993). For
more information on TIPI, see “The Texas Indus-
trial Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic
Review, November 1989). For more information
on the Texas Leading Index and its components,
see “The Texas Index of Leading Indicators:
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas Fed
Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are avail-
able on the Dallas Fed’s electronic bulletin board,
Fed Flash (214) 922-5199 or (800) 333-1953.
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Texas Employment Total Nonfarm Employment
Texas Private
Leading TIPI Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
9/95 — — 154.4 412.3 1,035.0 1,463.1 5,042.9 8,107.7 1,796.0 694.6
8/95 113.2 119.2 153.8 407.6 1,034.4 1,466.4 5,037.7 8,099.9 1,791.2 691.1
7/95 112.9 119.6 154.1 405.2 1,031.9 1,458.5 5,020.0 8,069.7 1,786.8 690.3
6/95 112.6 119.2 155.3 404.2 1,032.3 1,451.9 5,002.9 8,046.6 1,787.6 686.6
5/95 112.4 119.1 155.7 402.7 1,031.3 1,448.1 4,980.7 8,018.5 1,786.5 686.5
4/95 111.2 118.8 156.1 403.7 1,033.4 1,444.6 4,975.2 8,013.0 1,783.2 685.8
3/95 110.1 118.7 156.7 406.3 1,032.2 1,441.0 4,941.8 7,978.0 1,784.4 685.3
2/95 111.1 119.1 157.3 405.7 1,029.7 1,438.3 4,930.7 7,961.7 1,782.4 684.3
1/95 110.4 118.9 157.6 402.0 1,026.5 1,433.3 4,914.0 7,933.4 1,781.8 681.5
12/94 111.4 118.3 158.9 398.8 1,025.0 1,433.2 4,916.9 7,932.8 1,774.5 675.3
11/94 111.9 118.2 160.1 393.0 1,021.7 1,426.8 4,893.0 7,894.6 1,764.0 674.2
10/94 112.0 118.5 160.6 388.2 1,018.8 1,424.5 4,865.5 7,857.6 1,755.1 669.0
Total Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1991 = 100
Texas Industrial Production Index
Texas Leading Index and Nonfarm Employment
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The Eleventh District economy is
growing at a moderate pace. Employ-
ment in Louisiana accelerated slightly
from July to September, following weak
growth since January. New Mexico
employment growth picked up in the
third quarter, after weakness in the
second quarter. Texas nonfarm employ-
ment growth slowed in September,
following strong growth in the prior
three months. The most recent Beige
Book survey of District business con-
ditions also suggests slightly weaker
growth in Texas.
Manufacturing remains one of the
weakest sectors of the District economy.
Texas manufacturing production de-
clined in August after a mild pickup in
June and July. Manufacturing employ-
ment in the District states increased
only slightly in the third quarter. Weak-
ness in the national economy this year
and a decline in exports, particularly to
Mexico, have led to weakness in the
manufacturing sector. In the second
quarter, a 10-percent decline in exports
to Mexico caused total Texas exports
to decline 2.2 percent. Construction-
related manufacturing industries have
also been weak, although a recent
pickup in residential building should
result in increased orders for these
industries over the next six months.
A recent pickup in new home build-
ing has boosted District construction
employment, which surged in August
and September. Despite declines in the
first quarter, construction employment
levels remain higher than the strong
levels posted a year ago. District busi-
ness contacts report that lower mort-
gage rates and declines in home prices
in many markets have spurred the
turnaround.
The Texas leading index increased in
August for the fifth straight month. The
index has recovered from sharp declines
in the first quarter that were mainly due
to the peso devaluation. In May, the
index surpassed its previous peak and
has since experienced steady growth.
Five of the nine indicators increased in
the three months ending in August, led
by solid gains in stock prices and retail
sales. Recent movements in the index
suggest that moderate expansion will




P A I D
DALLAS, TEXAS
PERMIT NO. 151
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS
P.O. BOX 655906
DALLAS, TEXAS  75265–5906
The Challenge of NAFTA
An international economic forum evaluating NAFTA’s impact almost two years after the treaty’s passage. Panelists will examine international trade
and investment in the NAFTA countries, financial interdependencies, macro-industrial and micro-industrial development, and retail trade.
WHEN: December 3, 6:30 p.m.–8:30 p.m. (reception) and December 4, 9:00 a.m.–6:30 p.m. (program)
PLACE: Camino Real Paso del Norte Hotel, 101 S. El Paso St., El Paso, Texas 79901
REGISTRATION DEADLINE AND FEE: November 24, 1995; $90 per person
FOR MORE INFORMATION: Leigh Bloss, El Paso Branch–Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, (915) 521-8235, Fax (915) 521-8284
PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS
• Addresses by Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda, UCLA; Dallas Fed President Robert D. McTeer, Jr.; and Ariel Buira, subgovernor, Banco de México.
• NAFTA and International Trade and Investment with Oscar Vera Ferrer, Centro de Estudios Económicos del Sector Privado; Alan Rugman,
University of Toronto; and Dallas Fed economists Harvey Rosenblum, Lucinda Vargas and William C. Gruben.
• NAFTA and Financial Interdependence with William C. Gruben, Alfredo Phillips Olmedo, North American Development Bank; Sylvia Maxfield,
Yale University; Catherine Mansell Carstens, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México.
• NAFTA and Macro-Industrial Development with Timothy P. Roth, UT El Paso; Chuck Cunningham, Delphi Packard Electric Systems—General
Motors; Alberto Sandoval, Internacional de Cerámica; Carlos de Orduña, Sanyo North America Corp.; José Reyes Ferriz, Reyes, Estrada y Fernández
• NAFTA and Micro-Industrial Development with Lucinda Vargas; Hector Moreira, Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey;
Luis Ortega, Kokopeli; Gabriela Quirarte, D.M. Distillery; Ed L. Romero, Advanced Sciences.
• NAFTA and Retail Trade with Frank Hoy, UT El Paso; Nora Yu, Cámara Nacional de Comercio de Cd. Juárez; and Michael Patrick, Texas A&M
International University.
Sponsored by the El Paso Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, in conjunction with the University of Texas at El Paso, College of Business;
New Mexico State University, Border Research Institute; Universidad Autónoma de Cd. Juárez, Instituto de Ciencias Sociales y Administración;
and Universidad Autónoma de Chihuahua, Departamento de Vinculación y Transferencia de Tecnología.